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Abstract. Plato’s reflections on Forms have generally been overlooked, in 
contemporary Philosophy of Language, as a serious resource for illuminating the 
notion of word meaning. In part, this is due to the influence of Wittgenstein’s critical 
reflections on looking for ‘something in common’ as explanatory for use of a general 
term. I argue that, far from being undermined, appeal to Forms can both help explain, 
and provide corrective critical insight into, Wittgenstein’s observations. Plato’s 
reflections provide insight into word meaning that is relevant for contemporary 
research. Relevant considerations include: (1) explanation as to why an item is F; (2) 
looking to ‘what something is’; (3) the compresence of opposites; (4) whether 
participation in a Form involves approximation to the Form.   
 
 
Wittgenstein writes in the Blue Book that we have a mistaken tendency to ‘look for something 
in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term’, with this 
commonality being ‘the justification for applying the general term’ to those entities (1972, p. 
17). Wittgenstein suggests that there may be no such commonality. The point is repeated in 
the Philosophical Investigations. If you look at different games, ‘you will not see something 
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series at that’ (1953, §66). If 
this is true, appeal to something in common should not be the basis for an account of how we 
use general terms. 
 Wittgenstein’s position is sometimes taken to undermine a picture of predication that 
arises from Plato’s discussions of Forms.1 Some passages in Plato indicate the following: at 
least some words can be associated with a Form, and all the items to which the word truly 
applies are items that participate in that Form (Phaedo 78d–e; 102b–103c; Republic 596a; 
Parmenides 130e–131a; Phaedrus 238a). This suggests an account in which a ‘something in 
common’ explains the use of a word.  
 In spite of initial appearances, it does not directly follow that there need be a conflict 
between Wittgenstein’s discussion and Plato’s account of the Forms. It may depend on the 
type of commonality that we are looking for. Richman (1962) observed that what counts as 
‘something common’ (Wittgesntein’s phrase) is open to interpretation, and concludes: 
 
When we look once more at the question: Do (must) the referents of a general term 
have something common? … it does not seem to me that the notion of ‘something 
common’ is clear enough to indicate that a negative answer to the question is 
justified. (p. 830) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I would in particular like to thank M. M. McCabe for encouragement and for extensive comments on 
a first draft of the paper. The paper has also been significantly improved by criticisms of an earlier draft 
that a referee for this journal provided. 
1 Forster says that Wittgenstein wants to establish ‘that a certain theory about the nature of all general 
concepts that was first propounded by Plato … is mistaken’, and Forster thinks that this project of 
Wittgenstein’s is ‘basically correct and extremely important’ (2010, pp. 71, 72). 
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Wittgenstein does not usually discuss what notion of commonality he has mind, but he does 
provide a hint in the Blue Book. He compares the quest for an explanatory common property 
with an attitude that thinks of properties as ‘ingredients of the things which have the 
properties … as alcohol is of beer and wine’ (1972, p. 17). The analogy suggests an attitude in 
which properties are thought of as independently identifiable elements that play a role in 
making up a particular whole. Suppose that when a general term ‘F’ is correctly applied to an 
item that item can be said to have the property of being F. If properties are thought of as 
ingredients, application of the term ‘F’ to multiple items should correlate with a common 
element that is found in the make up of those items. Wittgenstein denies that any such 
commonality need be in place to account for our use of general terms.  
 But Plato likewise, as I will show, recognized that groupings marked by general terms 
need not be characterized by shared ingredients. He explicitly allows for the fact that items 
named by a general term may vary ‘in every sort of way [pantoiōs]’ (Republic VI 484b), and 
can be ‘in some way even quite unlike each other’, even ‘contrary’ [enantias] to each other 
(Philebus 12c, 13a). Plato’s account of the Forms is in fact explanatory of this observation, 
rather than being challenged by it. In addition, his discussions, as I will also show, suggest a 
way in which Wittgenstein’s account falls short of providing an adequate account of our use 
of words. 
 It is not clear that Plato saw Forms as explanatory of words in general (see Harte 
2011, pp. 196–201), so we cannot straightforwardly claim that Plato was looking to provide a 
general account of predication. Plato’s interests, in general, are not focused on words but on 
the way the world is.2 Independently, though, of the original scope that Plato intended for the 
explanatory role of Forms, his discussions provide significantly interesting resources that can 
be applied to an explanation of our use of words in language. This is because how we 
understand a word can be construed in terms of how something has to be in order for the word 
to apply. 
 Contemporary Philosophy of Language has, though, largely ignored Plato’s discussions 
of Forms. This is a serious oversight, especially given that the topic of word meaning, though 
central to our understanding of language, remains underdeveloped. Pietroski, for example, has 
written that  the ‘right conception of linguistic meaning may still be undreamt of’.3 There are 
several aspects of Plato’s discussion that can be applied to a linguistically oriented thesis: (1) 
the type of explanation relevant to a question as to why an item is tall, beautiful, or whatever; 
(2) looking to ‘what something is’; (3) the compresence of opposites; (4) whether 
participation in a Form involves approximation to the Form. I discuss these in sections 1 – 4,4 
and I finish with a critical reflection on an aspect of Wittgenstein’s discussion in section 5.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Thanks to M.M. McCabe for stressing this (p.c.). Nehamas 1979, p. 102 does suggest that one of the 
central purposes of the theory of Forms was that of articulating ‘the very concept of predication’, and 
Bostock 1986 suggests that Plato had word meanings in mind when discussing Forms. Even if such 
claims are too strong, it remains the case that many of the things that Plato said about the Forms apply, 
with intriguing relevance, to the topic of word meaning 
3 Pietroski 2005, p. 271. Recanati likewise comments that ‘nearly everything is up for grabs’ (2010, p. 
18). 
4 Other issues, such as the Third Man argument and self-predication, or separation and/or immanence, 
are not relevant for my focus. Following much scholarship, I treat Plato’s discussion of the Forms as an 
evolving series of reflections rather than a set ‘theory’ as such, though (see White 1992) I do not 
suppose that Plato fundamentally changed his views. 
	   3	  
1. Explanation for why x is F 
 
If we are asked to do something immediately, we may ask (or wonder) what ‘immediately’ 
means in that instance. If it is an instruction to put our pens down in an exam, it might mean 
within the next two seconds. If it is an instruction to begin cooking a meal, it might mean in 
the next few minutes. If it is a publisher telling us we need to finish a novel, it might mean in 
the next few days. Similar clarifications may be relevant for other words. We may ask what is 
meant by the claim that someone is tall (the point may be that the person is seven feet tall), or 
that cycling on roads is dangerous (the point may be that you are basically unprotected while 
moving within inches of traffic), and so on. Different instances may elicit different answers as 
to what is being conveyed by a given word. 
 These are all answers to what is meant by a use of a word or phrase. They focus on an 
instance, or type of instance, that will appropriately manifest the condition that the word was 
used to express. The appropriate manifestation can vary in different instances, and in this 
sense what the word ‘means’—what it is used to convey—can vary. 
 But in another sense, these are not answers to the question of what a word means. 
‘Immediately’ does not, per se, mean any particular time interval, nor ‘tall’ some particular 
height, nor ‘dangerous’ some particular situation. In this other sense, the perspective is on 
‘meaning’ qua that which constitutes the appreciation of a word that separates English 
speakers from those who do not speak English and that is pre-theoretically expressed as 
‘knowing what the word means’. The perspective is not on an assessment of what a word has 
been used to convey in a given instance—an assessment that may differ between those who 
know English—but on the initial grasp of a word that initiates the process of comprehension. 
 Moravcsik makes this point using the example ‘emergency’. A professor is leaving 
for abroad and tells the secretary not to ring except in case of an emergency.  
 
I take it that, at this point, both the professor and his secretary understand the 
meaning of ‘emergency’.  Nevertheless, further discussion is called for. … [I]n this 
case we need to supplement the discussion with having Professor Jones say 
something like: ‘By “emergency” I mean here things like an earthquake, injury to my 
children, the university going bankrupt, etc.’  Even if both Professor Jones and his 
secretary understand English perfectly, it is informative for Professor Jones to add 
this.  (Moravcsik 1990, 252) 
 
What is at stake here is not the understanding of English but the particular force with which 
‘emergency’ is used in this instance. At least prima facie, these appear to be two different 
notions of word meaning. An answer to what is meant by a word does not look as though it 
gives an answer to what constitutes the understanding of a word that English speakers 
possess.  
 Something very similar to this distinction is found in Plato. In the Phaedo (96ff.) 
Socrates explains how in his youth he had looked to natural science for the aitiai (often 
translated, a bit misleadingly, by ‘causes’) of everything. The use of aitia here indicates some 
type of explanation, something that answers a ‘why’ question, but where the type of answer 
can be much broader than our contemporary notion of cause (see Vlastos 1969; Sedley 1998; 
Politis 2010). The type of answer—the type of explanation, or aitia—that is in view can be 
illustrated from Hippias Major 294a–b: 
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we were looking for that by which [hō(i)] all beautiful things are beautiful—like that 
by which [hō(i)] all large things are large, that is, by exceeding [tō(i) huperechonti]. 
 
That ‘by which’, or because of which, all large things are large is by exceeding (something 
else). This type of reason need not make reference to the dimensions that, in a sense, make a 
person tall, nor to the biological cause for why that person is tall. There is, beyond these other 
types of explanation, a further explanation in which it is the exceeding of normal height that is 
explanatory of why ‘large’ is predicated of that person.  
 When Socrates says that he had looked, in his youth, to natural science for 
explanation [aitia], his examples indicate that he now sees himself as having looked for the 
wrong type of explanation. Socrates had thought it was appropriate to say that a tall man was 
taller than a small man ‘by a head’ [tē(i) kephalē(i)] (Phaedo 96e), as if to say that the extra 
head-length was the explanation for why the man is described as tall. But, in a converse case 
to the one Wittgenstein discussed, this common factor can also account for why someone is a 
small man—they are shorter ‘by a head’ (Phaedo 101a). This undermines the claim that this 
type of statement, as to why someone is tall (or short), is appropriate for the explanation of 
tallness (or shortness) that Plato is looking for.5  
 Similar considerations are brought to bear on the explanation for why something is 
beautiful:  
 
if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or 
any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me. (Phaedo 100c–
d; cf. Republic 476b, 480a) 
 
A particular colour or shape, while it may in a sense be responsible for an item’s appearing 
beautiful, may in other items be what contributes to making those items ugly: gold may make 
some things beautiful but not if the setting is inappropriate (Hippias Major 289e–290d). Just 
as a head-length is not itself the explanation of tallness or shortness, neither is a particular 
colour (or whatever) the explanation of beauty or ugliness. 
 In this context, Plato asserts that the only true explanation for beauty, or bigness 
(etc.), will be beauty itself, or bigness itself (Phaedo 100–101). I suggest that this, in part, is 
to say that an explanation of beauty or bigness will not be constructed in terms of the 
concretely manifested parts that happen, in a given case, to characterize the item to which 
predications of beauty or bigness are applied. In terms of such parts, it is plausible to suggest 
that there could be such variability in how a property is manifested that the claim of no 
common ingredient, between items named by a general term, will be justified.6 
 To illustrate how, even so, there can be a commonality between items labeled by a 
general term, we can consider Plato’s suggestion that there is a level of explanation, relating 
to the property of being large, which relates not to particular heights or efficient causes but to 
exceeding. While this is not complete as an account of the basis for our use of the word 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As Irwin puts it, a property G cannot be the explanation of x’s being F ‘if either (1) G is present in y, 
but y is not F, or (2) G is not present in z, but z is F’ (1995, p. 155; cf. p. 159; and see Nehamas 1979;  
Politis 2010).  
6 Ide 2002 suggests that a key problem addressed in the Philebus is: ‘given a single account of being F, 
how could different F’s have different properties in virtue of being F? The only possible answer is that 
they have different properties because they satisfy the single account in different ways’ (p. 266; cf. 
Harte 2002, pp. 177ff. For an example, see Hoyningen-Huene 2015 on the term ‘refinement’).  
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‘large’—not all dimensions along which something can exceed another thing relate to 
largeness—it does indicate a partial and informative type of explanation. An ant that exceeds 
typical ant size may be a large ant, and a building that exceeds typical building size may be a 
large building. In appropriate contexts, almost any piece of physical reality can be correctly 
described as large. There is no motivation to search for an ingredient, common to (almost) 
every portion of physical reality, as explanatory of why ‘large’ may be correctly applied to 
those portions. This, though, is consistent with ascribing the property of being large to any 
item of which ‘large’ is correctly used, with this use based on the common factor of 
exceeding. 
 Suppose that explanation began, contrary to the picture I have just given, with the 
aitiai that Socrates wishes to set aside as inappropriate to the ‘why is it F’ question, namely, 
the explanations couched in terms of the particular manifestations, or types of manifestation, 
that instantiate examples of F-ness in different cases (see Wolfsdorf 2003). The associated 
notion of word understanding would presumably be based on familiarity with those instances, 
with application of a term to new instances based on the presence of an appropriate similarity 
between the new instances and those already correctly described with ‘F’. Such an account is 
partially endorsed by Recanati (2004, pp. 146–151) under the label of ‘meaning 
eliminativism’ (Recanati relates this approach to Wittgenstein). This is an account that 
explains word use on the basis of a knowledge of ‘source situations’ (previous uses) and 
judgements of similarity to those previous uses. In effect, the question of word understanding 
that corresponds to the pre-theoretic notion of ‘what the word means’ is being answered in 
terms of a compendium of answers to what is meant ‘by’ a word. Familiarity with previous 
uses—the instances to which the term has been applied—is implicitly taken as constituting 
the basis of understanding. 
 In contrast, by looking to a type of question that is not properly answered in terms of 
the instances that manifest a given property, Plato indicates that there is an alternative type of 
explanation. This is a pointer to how we should consider our understanding of words, and it 
relates to the notion of a Form. 
 
 
2.The seal of ‘what it is’   
 
Plato makes repeated use of the semi-technical phrase ‘what is F’ [ho estin F], or sometimes 
simply ‘what is’ [ho estin] (see Adomello 2013). It is used in special respect of the Forms, 
indicating in some sense the true nature of something. That which is ‘equal itself’, as opposed 
to a particular instance of equal items, is the Form, ‘the what is equal’ [to ho estin ison] 
(Phaedo 74d). To talk about what a bed really is is to talk about that ‘upon which we set this 
seal, “what is” …’ (Phaedo 75c–d; cf. 92d–e). For my purposes, I will illustrate what may be 
in mind here by considering a bed, as discussed at Republic X 596e. There is debate about 
Plato’s attitude to treating artifacts as having Forms (see Fine 1995, chapter 6), but I will 
focus on the more neutral sense that there is something that beds ‘are’, and I read Plato’s 
comments in this light. A representation, such as a painting of a bed, is ‘sort of’ [tropoi] a 
bed—it is the appearance of one. A craftsperson makes something that concretely is a bed, 
manifesting what a bed is in a specific instance. But this is not to make that which a bed is [ho 
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esti klinē].7 The notion of what a bed is is presupposed, at least in general, in the making of a 
particular item that is a bed. While a craftsperson might merely copy an existing bed (or a 
representation of a bed), in general we may suppose that they are guided by their 
understanding of what a bed is, an understanding that will derive from what a bed is used for. 
This, in the way I am construing it, is to understand what the Form of a bed is (see Frede 
1999, 204ff.; Thomas 2014, 183f.). Similarly, a carpenter making a shuttle may be guided by 
the Form of a shuttle, ‘the thing itself which is a shuttle’ [auto ho estin kerkis]; for an item to 
possess the Form of a shuttle is for the item to be made in such a way that it is able to perform 
the work that shuttles are used for (Cratylus 389a–c). There is a sense in which the Form 
indicates in the most ‘real’ way what a bed or shuttle is (cf. how we may speak of what 
something ‘really’ is).8 This connects with a shift in focus from the particular manifestation 
(the ‘sensible’) to the intelligible: we get to what is most true of a thing by approaching ‘the 
object with thought alone’, which we use to ‘track down each reality pure and by itself [auto 
kath’ hauto]’ (Phaedo 66a).9 
 The phrase ‘what is F’ is ambiguous. Two interpretations are readily available 
(Adomello 2013 mentions others). One corresponds to the case where, in asking ‘What is 
hot?’, we are looking for an answer as to which item happens to be hot (e.g. ‘That radiator’). 
A second interpretation is where we are looking for an answer as to what hotness consists in. 
Adomello argues that the former is Plato’s more likely usage, indicating the particular Form 
that constitutes a given characteristic. But Adomello allows that there may also be hints of the 
latter reading, in which the focus is on what characterizes a given Form. In particular, 
Adomello suggests that to know a Form is ‘to know what it is for something to be F’ (p. 63; 
the same suggestion is found in Nehamas 1979, p. 95; Sedley 2007, p. 84). Plato also, in 
many passages, expresses unambiguous focus on what characteristics constitute something’s 
being such-and-such (cf. Politis 2010). He speaks of what any given thing ‘actually is’ [ho 
tunchanei hekaston on] (Phaedo 65d–e). He asks ‘what is [pot’ estin] imitation’ (Republic X 
595c) and speaks of knowing what sight or hearing is [pot’ estin opsis … akoē] (Laches 
190a). Sometimes the relevant characteristics are described or implied. He attempts in the 
Republic to explain what it is for a state, or soul, to be just (each part does its proper job). 
Knowledge [epistēmē], on one account, is ‘to know, concerning what is, how it is’ [to on 
gnōnai hōs echei] (Republic V 478a). We are said to know what the ‘equal itself’ is 
[epistametha auto ho estin] (Phaedo 74a–b), and this clearly corresponds to knowing what it 
is for two things to be equal (viz. as neither exceeding nor being exceeded by one another; see 
Sedley 1998, p. 128 for this suggestion). Speed is ‘the power of accomplishing a great deal in 
a short time’ (Laches 192b); shape ‘is that which limits a solid’ (Meno 76a).  
 It is one thing to note Plato’s interest in what something is, another to give it plausible 
application and articulation. I will proceed by making a suggestion that, though mostly no 
more than hinted at in Plato, is supported by his discussions of Forms. 
 The first part of the suggestion is that we can plausibly apply the theme of knowing 
‘what something is’ to the topic of linguistic understanding: to understand a word can be 
construed in terms of knowing how something, or some situation, has to be in order for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ‘[Plato] distinguishes ho esti klinē, the Form of Bed or what a bed is, from klinēn tina, some particular 
bed, which the carpenter builds’ Prior 1983, 35. 
8 This corresponds to treating apparent ‘self-predication’ (the Form F is itself F) as meaning that the 
Form F is what it is to be F (see Nehamas 1979; White 1992; Silverman 2002). 
9 I here interpret ‘itself by itself’ as indicating a focus just on the Form rather than on a sensible that 
manifests the Form. Cf. Parmenides 129a–d.   
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word to apply. As Plato comments, ‘Do you think that any one can understand the name of a 
thing when he doesn’t know what the thing is [ti estin]?—No, certainly not’ (Theaetetus 
147b).10 I do not need to know that a speaker, in a given instance, means ‘in five minutes’ by 
‘immediately’ in order to count as competent with English. I do, though, need to have a grasp 
of what immediacy is, or of what an emergency is, and so on—or at least I take this to be a 
valid intuition, albeit one that is not usually expressed by theorists working on word meaning. 
Other examples can help elicit this intuition. We use ‘because’ when we wish to convey that 
an explanatory relation holds and ‘cause’ when we wish to convey that a causal relation 
holds. While metaphysical or scientific insight into cause or explanation is presumably 
limited, I would find it harsh to be required to deny that there is an explanatorily important 
sense in which competent users of ‘because’ and ‘cause’ know ‘what it is’ that constitutes an 
explanation or a cause. 
 This last example and, more generally, the intuition that we really do understand the 
words we use, even without metaphysical insight, suggests that we need not construe the task 
of articulating word understanding in terms of an account aimed at providing a scientific or 
metaphysical appraisal of how items or relations are constituted. Here my focus diverges 
somewhat from Plato’s demanding conditions on understanding and knowledge. I am taking it 
that there is an appropriate sense in which our everyday appreciation of a word not only 
underpins our use of words but also provides us with an understanding of what emergencies, 
causes, explanations (and so on) are, even if this is not an understanding that provides us with 
a metaphysically or scientifically informed analysis. (Cf. Chomsky 2000, who relates 
knowledge of language to our everyday human concerns and distinguishes this from the type 
of inquiry relevant to scientific investigation. Bostock 1994 makes a similar point.) 
 But how can we flesh this out into a more concrete proposal? I propose that we look 
to simple and recurring commonalities in how we relate to items and situations or in how 
items and situations relate to one another. The motivation for this is threefold: (i) the type of 
regularities I will describe are part of our shared everyday interaction with items, so they 
provide a plausible basis for a common understanding of the words we use; (ii) the 
regularities do not depend on common ingredients; (iii) the regularities can plausibly be 
associated with the Forms. 
 The general thought has already been illustrated in the (partial) explanation offered 
for our use of ‘large’. Rather than looking to a large-making ingredient, the relevant 
explanation looks to the presence of a situation that displays the relation of exceeding. This is 
a relation between items that we share an understanding of and which, unlike explanations 
based on material or efficient causes, captures at least something of our everyday intuition as 
to what it is to be large. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Cratylus may seem the obvious text to appeal to, but there is reason to doubt its relevance. In the 
Cratylus, Plato does say that there is something about a word that ‘fits’ it to what we apply it to. He 
says that ‘the ousia of the thing … is exhibited [dēloumenē] in its name’ (393d), and he speaks of the 
expert name-giver as the one who can ‘put [a thing’s] form into letters and syllables’ (390e; cf. 422d). 
On the other hand, perhaps partly in virtue of wanting to align what is ‘exhibited’ with the actual letters 
and syllables used, Plato often in practice describes merely typical characteristics of items rather than a 
putative Form as such. For example, the sun might be called hēlios because the sun ‘collects’ [halizein] 
people together when it rises. Plato offers other options for ‘sun’, showing that he was not thinking 
here in terms of a single Form of the sun (408e–409a).  
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 The point can be illustrated with other words.11 Consider ‘obstacle’. Many things can 
be obstacles, but we do not apply ‘obstacle’ on the basis of a shared ingredient that we 
discover possessed by all items that are obstacles. Rather, being an obstacle pertains to 
manifesting a relation of prevention (typically of movement) to something else. It is this role 
as a preventer that licenses use of the term ‘obstacle’. Given the variety of things that move 
and the variety of ways in which they move, the items that prevent movement will also vary 
enormously. Bumps in the floor prevent marbles from progressing; anti-tank constructions 
prevent movement of armoured vehicles. For both cases, this licenses use of the word 
‘obstacle’ and so licenses the ascription of the property of being an obstacle to small bumps 
and large barriers. The ascription is based on ‘something in common’, but this commonality is 
not conceived in terms of a shared ingredient. Rather, it relates to a relation of prevention 
manifested between a potentially moving item and another item.  
 I take this role as a preventer to correspond to a basic intuition as to what obstacles 
are. While an answer to the question ‘Why is that an obstacle?’ can indeed be given in terms 
of the particular sensible characteristics of an item (it is made of concrete, it is thirty feet 
wide, and so on), there is also an answer to be given in terms of the role an item plays in 
preventing something else. I take it that it is this latter answer that corresponds both to the 
form of explanation that Socrates was interested in and to the appropriate form of explanation 
for how we understand a word. 
 Or consider ‘open’. There are many ways in which things can be open, in the sense 
that the physical manifestation of the state of being open may differ across instances: bottles 
are open in one way, books in another, rooms in another. Particular things can be open in 
more than one way: a washing machine can be open in a way that allows clothes to be placed 
in the drum or open in a way that allows an engineer access to the motor. It hardly makes 
sense to suppose that there could be an explanatory common ingredient found across all ways 
of being open. But, arguably, we can describe a commonality that licenses the use of ‘open’: 
an item is open when it enables access, whether that is access to contents the item itself 
contains (as when a room is open) or to something else to which the item typically prevents 
access (as when a door is open). This characterization is neutral as to what the contents are, 
how they are contained, or the type of access that is required. Plausibly, this characterization 
relates to a basic understanding of what it is to be open. 
 The general suggestion can be further illustrated with respect to Harte’s (2002) 
discussion of parts and wholes in Plato. Consider a dinner party (ibid. pp. 159–165). A dinner 
party is made up of guests. But for an item to be a guest is not for that item to possess an 
ingredient that constitutes it as a guest—as if to suggest that we could construct a guest-
containing situation by choosing items that, prior to that situation, already have the status of 
being guests. Rather, it is by virtue of belonging to the dinner party that the items attain guest 
status. The whole (the dinner party) has parts (the guests); but it is misleading to say that the 
whole is constructed from those parts given that the parts only have their status by virtue of 
the whole. 
 From this perspective, which Harte ascribes to Plato, wholes relate to structure, not to 
ingredients. Ingredients will be present where there is a whole and, for some forms of 
explanation, reference to those ingredients will be appropriate (as when we say ‘It’s an 
obstacle because it is made of concrete’). But there is another form of explanation for which 
the whole is prior to the parts, and this form of explanation is given not in terms of ingredients 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For a particularly interesting discussion of the word ‘refinement’ and, significantly, of Wittgenstein's 
example ‘Spiel’, see Hoyningen-Huene 2015. 
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(even though the ingredients need to be appropriate for manifesting the whole) but in terms of 
a structure in which something occurs or that something helps to manifest. While obstacles 
and open items are not elucidated in terms of a wider structure in the same way that guests are 
in the dinner party structure, the role of preventer, or the status of providing access, does 
relate to a relational structure that is precipitated, so to speak, when the items play the role 
that they do.12 
 We can combine this with Harte’s suggestion that discussion of form in the later 
dialogues can be associated with the structures that constitute a whole (2002, ch. 4).13 I will 
generalize this by taking structure as a way to elucidate the notion of a Form (on associating 
Forms with structure, or abstract patterns, see also Prior 1983; Thomas 2014). That is to say, a 
Form is envisaged in terms of a specific functional or relational structure. Applied to a 
hypothesis about words, this is to say that to understand a word is to grasp the relevant 
structure. This will be a commonality across instances, such as the commonalities of 
prevention of movement or the enabling of access. The commonality can be described 
independently of the particular ways in which these structures are manifested in a given 
case.14  
 Given this, we can develop an argument to explain why, in principle, general terms 
do not apply to items on account of shared ingredients. In the favoured sense of explanation, 
no item is an obstacle because of its ingredients. The ingredients only attain their status as 
ingredients of an obstacle when there is an explanation of the obstacle in terms of the whole, 
that is, in terms of the preventing-structure that the item helps to manifest. It is this type of 
commonality that corresponds to a Form and hence, by hypothesis, to what guides our use of 
‘obstacle’. Because wholes are conceived, primarily, in terms of structure and not in terms of 
a composition of parts, it follows that the explanatory basis for use of a general term will not 
be a criterion that looks to the parts with a view to determining a diagnostic that defines a 
putative class of instances. The explanatory value of the ingredients with respect to a 
predication is dependent on the whole that licenses the predication. Hence, the ingredients 
themselves are, in a sense, unseen by and irrelevant to the predication. 
 On this understanding of Forms, we see that an account of predication that draws 
from Plato’s discussion is not only consistent with a lack of common ingredients between the 
items to which a general term applies, but it is also explanatory of why, in general, we would 
have no reason to expect commonality at the level of ingredients.  
 I conclude this section by noting some problems. Scientific terms and terms for 
species put pressure on associating word understanding with a knowledge of what something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 cf. McCabe 1994, pp. 224–234, who argues that, for the late Plato, relations between things are the 
context in which individuals appear. That is to say, we do not start with the kind ‘obstacle’ and then 
count items as individuated by that kind; rather, we start with a preventing relation that provides the 
context in which an individual obstacle appears. Individuation is ‘relative to something’s place among 
other somethings’ (p. 231). From this perspective, we can see that the ‘ingredients’ of a thing are not 
the focus, though the possibility of playing a role in a structure will depend on having the appropriate 
ingredients.  
13 Health is a harmonious blend of elements in the body; music is some pertinent relation between the 
high/low, the fast/slow (Harte 2002, pp. 191–2). In similar fashion, justice is characterized in the 
Republic by the parts (whether of state or soul) doing their proper job, an account that enables Plato to 
explain how ‘just’ can apply, univocally, to both the state and the soul (Republic V 434a–c). 
14 By hypothesis, a Form is not identical with any instance nor with any collection of instances; and a 
Form may be thought of without thinking of an instance, in exactly the way we have been doing by 
speaking of ‘preventer of movement’. 
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is. I do not claim to have an account for such words and to some extent bracket them. This is 
not entirely arbitrary. Unlike most of the words we use, words such as ‘elm’, ‘encephalitis’, 
‘lepton’ appear to act, at least to some extent, simply as labels for some stuff, or thing, about 
which we may, in varying degrees, be largely ignorant (cf. Millikan 2000). If so, there may be 
a principled reason for supposing that an account of such words will vary somewhat from an 
account of words such as ‘large’, ‘obstacle’, ‘open’ with which we display an easy familiarity. 
It is this latter type of word that makes up the vast bulk of our discourse (though in 
comparison with the ‘label’ type words, they have received little attention by philosophers). 
 Given the complexities of natural language, the specific suggestions that I have made 
for various words (with reference to exceeding, prevention, access) will always be susceptible 
to counter example. For example, for a suggested common structure, it may always be 
possible to think of situations that seem to fit the structure but where the word is not licensed. 
A peeled orange provides access to its contents, but we do not describe such an orange as 
‘open’. If we puncture a bicycle inner tube, we gain access to the air inside, but we do not 
describe this as an ‘open’ inner tube.15 Similarly, prevention does not distinguish obstacles 
from barriers, and not all types of exceeding license the use of ‘large’. Further, there may be 
uses of a word that appear not to fit the proposed structure, as with ‘The meeting is now open’ 
or ‘It is an open question’. 
 Responses to these problems can be offered,16 but I do not claim that the accounts are 
lexically complete as they stand—clearly, they are not. There are problems of 
implementation. I do not, though, see any reason to suppose that these problems make it 
likely that the account is wrong in principle.  
 
 
3. The compresence of opposites 
 
When we apply a term ‘F’ to an item, we may also ascribe the property of being F to that 
item. If we take this to indicate that the item is in part constituted by an element that licenses 
the use of ‘F’ and that is required for this use, we seem to be committed to an account in 
which there will only be one answer to the question of whether ‘F’ can be correctly used of an 
item: if the appropriate element is present, we can correctly use ‘F’, otherwise not. Plato 
observes that how we describe items does not always follow a pattern consistent with this 
picture. An item that we correctly describe as large can also correctly be described as small or 
not large: a large ant is not a large creature (cf. Phaedo 102b–d; Republic 479b). Similarly, an 
item we describe as beautiful may also be described as not beautiful. In the Symposium, a 
contrast is made between the Form of beauty and beautiful things: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thanks to Jeffrey King for the orange example and Michael Glanzberg for the puncture example. 
16 In response to the orange, we can argue that our sense of what is linguistically acceptable is 
influenced by the presence of competing more specific vocabulary (‘peeled’)—see Blutner 1998 for 
lexical blocking. Further, we would not say that a person misunderstands ‘open’ if they apply it to an 
orange (the fact that we would not say this, in spite of the fact that it is not an established usage, is 
highly significant). In response to the puncture, we can say that the notion of puncturing does not focus 
on access to the contents. Where we do have such interest, we may say ‘I opened it by puncturing it’, 
though not all puncturings are openings. For ‘It is an open question’ we may appeal to polysemy. 
Emphasis on a shared intelligible is intended to indicate the structure that informs our understanding of 
a particular sense; there is no entailment that words only have one sense. 
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it [the Form of beauty] is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, or beautiful 
at one time and not at another, or beautiful by one standard and ugly by another, or 
beautiful in one place and ugly in another … . (Symposium 211a; cf. Hippias Major 
289b–c; Republic V 479a–b) 
 
Beautiful things, by contrast, do vary in these respects. What is beautiful in one setting, or 
time, or place, may not be regarded as so in another. Plato makes a similar point for ‘equals’, 
albeit in an over-compressed passage that is open to a range of interpretation (see Sedley 
2007): equal sticks and stones ‘while remaining the same, appear to one [tō(i) men] to be 
equal and to another [tō(i) de] to be unequal’ (Phaedo 74b). Using the Symposium passage as 
a guide, I take the general point to be that even when we can properly describe two sticks as 
‘equal’ to one another, there may also be many contexts in which we would not describe those 
two sticks as equal to one another. This might be because there are different respects in which 
the sticks may or may not be equal (in length, width, weight, and so on); or maybe we apply 
different standards of measurement (for the purposes of building a fence, two sticks will count 
as equal even if, for the purposes of precise scientific measurement, they are unequal); 
perhaps Plato also envisages cases where we take one of the sticks and compare it to another 
stick (cf. Republic X 602d–e; Sedley 2007 rejects this option).17 Similarly (see Republic 479b, 
523e) doubles can be seen as halves (4 is double 2 and half 8); anything heavy can also be 
called light; what is thick can also be described as thin, what is hard can also be described as 
soft (hard cheese is soft compared with metal): ‘they will always have something of both in 
them’ (Republic V 479b). 
 If the immediate perceptible properties of an item are constant, we cannot 
straightforwardly appeal to the sensible properties in order to explain the compresence of 
opposites. A further explanation is required, and Plato will appeal to the ‘intelligible’ as that 
which fills this gap. Plato does not suppose that this phenomenon is entirely general. There is 
no instance, for example, ‘where our sight indicates that a finger is at the same time the 
opposite of a finger’ (Republic VII 523d; cf. Parmenides 130c–d). But where it does apply, 
explanation is needed. Following a suggestion from Harte, I will take Plato’s observation on 
the compresence of opposites, not as indicating a limit to the extent of the Forms (as if Forms 
are only required in cases where compresence is found), but as indicating a puzzle that any 
account needs to satisfy and that cannot be explained merely in terms of perception of 
sensibles (Harte 2011, pp. 200–1, 205). 
 The compresence of opposites is consistent with basing word use on the kind of 
commonality that I sketched in the previous section. An ant may exceed the typical ant in size 
and thereby be described as ‘large’, while also vastly failing to exceed many other living 
creatures and thereby be described as ‘small’. What prevents movement, and thereby counts 
as an obstacle, when we are walking—a brick wall, for example—will not count as an 
obstacle if we are in a tank. A washing machine counts as open for the laundry person if it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 McCabe comments: ‘Is Plato making a point about (1) relativism (everyone’s view of a given pair of 
sticks is different); (2) the imperfection of the physical world (any given pair of equals will not be 
equal in every respect); or (3) the structure of the phenomenal world (any stick is involved in relations 
of both equality or inequality)?’ (1994, p. 41). McCabe suggests Plato subscribes to all three but with a 
focus on (3), which she also describes as particulars being ‘naturally contextualized within their world’ 
(p. 44, cf. n. 12 above). There is an alternative text (reading tote men … tote de instead of tō(i) men … 
tō(i) de) ‘equal at one time and not at another’, which McCabe sets aside as of doubtful conceptual 
worth. 
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provides appropriate access to the drum, but this might not count as open for the engineer 
who requires access to the motor. Because the commonality relates to a relational structure, 
and the same item can play a role in different instances of such structures or instances where 
the structure is not manifested, we have a natural explanation for the phenomenon of the 
compresence of opposites. In the context of a given instance, an item may truly be an obstacle 
(because it prevents) or may truly be open (because it provides access), though the same item, 
in the same state, may in different contexts truly be described as not being an obstacle or as 
not being open.  
 Distinctions drawn in terms of ingredients would portion items into determinate 
extensions independently of the kind of relational structures that I have spoken of. If an 
ingredient is a mark that defines all and only members of a class, an item will be classified as 
a member of this class if it possesses the relevant ingredient, and not otherwise. The 
phenomenon of the compresence of opposites suggests that, as a general account, predicates 
do not pick out extensions determined by such classifying marks. The point is suggestively 
indicated by the evident way in which perhaps anything, in the appropriate context, could be 
correctly described as large or as an obstacle, or correctly described as not large or not an 
obstacle. The examples show that words, to be useful, do not need to be oriented to 
determining extensions on the basis of the kind of classifying marks that would determine that 
an item is either in, or not in, a particular grouping. But the examples also show that this does 
not preclude there being a common basis for the use of a predicate, upon which a judgement 
of truth or falsity may be made.  
 
  
4. Participation in Forms: degrees of approximation? 
 
We may describe a table as flat and a bowling green as flat. A table will typically be flatter 
than a bowling green. Does it follow that the word ‘flat’ relates less precisely to the bowling 
green than to the table, with some kind of degeneration in evidence with respect to how ‘flat’ 
relates to less flat items in comparison with very flat items? That is to say, does ‘flat’, when 
considered strictly, properly mean a perfectly flat surface, even though, in linguistic practice, 
we also apply it to surfaces that are often far from perfectly flat? There is an obvious way in 
which we can use predicates inaccurately. I speak inaccurately if I describe as flat a bowling 
green that has a mound in it. But suppose we stick to uses of a predicate that are regarded as 
accurate. We can still ask whether the predicate fits some of those uses better than others. For 
example, if two surfaces are smooth, we speak accurately, according to ordinary intuitions, if 
we describe both surfaces as smooth. Suppose, though, that one of those surfaces is smoother 
than the other (which, after all, will be the typical case). Do we want to say that the word 
‘smooth’ fits the smoother item better than the less smooth item? 
 Plato’s account allows words to either apply, or not, without there being degrees of 
accuracy with which the word applies to an item. I take this to be a desideratum of a theory of 
word meaning. In spite of the apparent plausibility of the suggestion that words such as ‘flat’ 
apply with differing degrees of ‘looseness’ depending on how close to a geometrical plane a 
surface comes (see e.g. Carston 2002, section 5.1.2), this is a picture that has no obvious 
application for many words.  
 Consider ‘open’; there is little or no motivation to suggest that some open items, or 
some ways of being open, are more precisely examples of being open than others. It would be 
odd to say that an open bottle is a better or worse example of being open than an open book, 
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or that a more widely open door is closer to the meaning of ‘open’ than a less widely open 
door. The point here is not to deny gradability of predication. A large ant is less large than a 
whale. The point, rather, is that there is motivation to deny gradability in truth.18 To say, of an 
appropriate instance, ‘That ant is large’ is as true as to say, of an appropriate instance, ‘That 
whale is large’. The correctness with which ‘large’ or ‘open’ is applied need not, in general, 
differ, even if there is also a way in which we can compare the scale of largeness or the 
wideness of being open across the several items that have been correctly described as large or 
open. 
 This also seems to be the way that Plato thinks of the relation between things and 
Forms, though the point is not beyond dispute. Nehamas (1975) notes several texts where 
Plato speaks of particulars as falling short of, or being inferior to, the Forms that they 
participate in.19 For example, there is ‘considerable deficiency’ [polu … endei] with respect to 
how equal sticks are equal in comparison with how the ‘equal itself’ is equal (Phaedo 74d). 
This may suggest an interpretation in which equal sticks vary with respect to how close they 
approximate to some ideal exemplar of equality, and Nehamas notes that many scholars have 
in fact expressed something like this view. 
 The context of Plato’s discussion, though, suggests an alternative interpretation (for 
the following, see Nehamas 1975; White 1992; Silverman 2002; Rowe 1993; Harte 2011; 
Adomello 2013), and Nehamas, for example, claims that, for Plato, ‘particulars participate in 
the Forms in different respects or in different contexts, but never, so far as I can tell, in 
different degrees’ (Nehamas 1975, p. 110). The deficiency that particulars display relates to 
their being distinct in type from the Forms themselves. Particulars suffer from the 
compresence of opposites: an item may be beautiful in one respect but not in another, or 
beautiful from different perspectives, or, due to change, be beautiful at one time and not at 
another. These characterize a form of deficiency that is not found with the Form itself. A 
Form is changeless. A Form, as I have expounded it, corresponds to a relational structure and 
from no perspective does it ever not correspond to that structure. 
 Rather than speaking in terms of degrees of participation in a Form, Plato speaks of 
sameness with respect to how items compare in respects of having a particular general term 
truly applied to them. If two items are described with the same word (such as ‘large’), this 
indicates that the two items are like each other in the respects in which that word was used of 
those items (Republic V 435a). A just man ‘will not differ at all [ouden dioisei] from a just 
city in respect of the very Form of justice, but will be like it’ (ibid., 435a–b). Bees do not 
differ [ouden diapherousin] from one another in being bees (Meno 72b). The strength of a 
man and a woman will be the same: ‘that strength will be the same and have the same Form, 
for by “the same” I mean that strength is no different as far as being strength [ouden diapherei 
pros to ischus einai hē ischus] whether in man or woman’ (Meno 72e). Different shapes 
(round, square, etc.) all equally participate in that which shape is: ‘the round is not more a 
shape [ouden mallon … schēma] than the straight’ (Meno 74d). Different multitudes differ in 
size, but Plato at no point indicates that the greater a multitude the greater the degree of 
participation in ‘multitude’ (see Parmenides). Hippias Major distinguishes the question of 
whether a pleasure is greater or smaller, more or less [meizōn … ē elattōn ē mallon ē hētton], 
from whether something differs ‘in this very way—in being a pleasure [tō(i) hē men hēdonē 
einai]’ (299d). The latter is denied, this being consistent with differing degrees of pleasure. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Thanks to Peter Sutton for suggesting this way of expressing the point. 
19 Phaedo 74d; 75a–b; Symposium 210e–212a (on true beauty); Republic 515d; Phaedrus 247c; 
Philebus 59d. 
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 Taking up the suggestion from section 2 (following Harte), participation conceived in 
terms of manifesting a status that is in part constituted in terms of a relation to other items—
such as exceeding the other items, or preventing movement, or enabling access—provides an 
account of how sensible items can relate to a Form without degrees of approximation. An ant 
can be large because it exceeds ordinary ants in size. The ant thereby, and not by matter of 
degree, manifests a condition that can be described as a participation in the Form of the large. 
The ant from other perspectives is not large; and the ant, at one stage of its existence, may not 
have been large even from the ant perspective. In this way, the ant is deficient with respect to 
the Form of the large, but this does not mean that the ant only participates in the Form to a 
small degree. A blue whale is deficient with respect to the large in the same way that an ant is, 
and yet both fully participate in the Form. Or consider what it is to be an obstacle. If the Form 
of an obstacle relates to prevention, a brick wall that prevents movement participates fully in 
the obstacle Form. This participation is not by matter of degree, as if a cliff were taken to 
participate more fully in the obstacle Form because the cliff prevents more types of motion. 
Differing degrees of prevention are consistent with the preventing items all equally 
participating in the Form. The deficiency of the wall is exactly the same as the deficiency 
displayed by a cliff: they are not always obstacles (sometimes they can be precisely that 
which enables movement, as when we stand on a cliff or wall and jump). 
 The picture presented here is consistent with the emphasis described in sections 1–3. 
We are not, when considering a Form, looking to a sensible instance, with respect to which a 
‘degree of participation’ account would be a natural corollary given that there are varying 
degrees of resemblance to an exemplar. Exemplars are instances, whether ideal or otherwise, 
but it is precisely the appeal to instances that Socrates takes as inadequate for an answer to the 
‘what is F’ question (and treating a Form merely as an ‘invisible’ instance does not make up 
for the explanatory inadequacy).20 Rather than looking to degrees of likeness to an instance, 
the picture I have drawn from the Forms is one in which we look to a notion of what 
something is. For being large, open, or an obstacle, I have suggested that we can understand 
these states in terms of exceeding, enabling access, or preventing movement. This is 
explanatory for how instances that vary considerably from one another can equally participate 
in the Form, given that the manifestation of these states is not determined by the presence of 
common ingredients.  
  
 
5. Criticizing Wittgenstein 
 
I have focused on an ‘ingredient’ perspective for the putative commonality that Wittgenstein 
rejects, and I have suggested that Wittgenstein’s comments can be reconciled with, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘Any attempt to conceive of the forms as perfect particulars … is problematic almost to the point of 
being nonsensical … [W]hat in the world could a quintessential instance of largeness, or humanity, be 
like?’ (Adomello 2013, p. 53). Perhaps the regress argument given at Parmenides 132a–b can be 
treated as a reductio of the supposition that a Form ‘appears’ to the ‘mind’s eye’ in a fashion analogous 
to being perceived. Socrates then suggests that Forms are ‘as if patterns set in nature [hōsper 
paradeigmata hestanai en tē(i) phusei]’, with participation in a Form meaning ‘nothing other than 
being modeled on them [eikasthēnai autois]’ (132d). Parmenides puts pressure on this by arguing for a 
regress derived from a consideration of ‘likeness’. These passages indicate a doubt over a construal of 
‘participation’ in terms of likeness to a paradigm instance (perceived in some inward fashion). There 
are other ways to construe the idea of being modeled on a pattern. 
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explained by, an appeal to the Forms. But why suppose that Wittgenstein limits the notion of 
something in common to the type of characteristic that fits the ingredient image? Might his 
claim be that any proposed commonality will, in the end, prove unable to account for how we 
use a general term?21 
 In practice, Wittgenstein limits himself to looking for ingredient-style characteristics, 
those specific elements that are found in the instance of which they are a part. In his 
discussion of ‘Spiel’ (game, play), for example, he briefly considers whether instances display 
characteristics such as winning and losing, or competition, or amusement (1953, §66). He 
does not consider commonalities where the focus is on an over-arching structural or relational 
characteristic that provides the constancy of focus appropriate to the ‘what it is’ and that is 
associated with the Forms. 
 One possibility is that this is simply an oversight in how Wittgenstein illustrates his 
concern, and that he would wish to apply his criticism to any level of commonality. There are 
two concerns with this, which I mention below. But first, it is also possible that the limitation 
in the kind of commonality considered is integral to Wittgenstein’s discussion of language.  
 The overall context in the Investigations is that of showing that how a word is used— 
and this may include specifying the items to which the word is truly applied in a given use— 
cannot be determined by some putative ‘meaning’ that we might formulate in terms of an 
explanation or definition. The explanations or definitions may help guide our use of a word 
(see e.g. 1953, §§50–55), but they do not actually fix how we use the word (see e.g. 1953, 
§§28–34, 53, 139–141).  
 However, suppose that it is possible to find a common ingredient across a set of items 
that fall under a given predicate. In principle, this would allow for a determinate diagnostic 
for defining a group of items to which a given term could truthfully be applied. The term need 
simply be correlated with those ingredients, and further considerations of use need not enter 
an account of what constitutes the extension of the term. This would undermine 
Wittgenstein’s claim that there is an element of decision, in our use of a word, that cannot be 
fixed beforehand. Hence, Wittgenstein illustrates the implausibility of there actually being the 
required common ingredients. 
 The crucial point here is that the type of commonality that I have associated with a 
Form need not be such as to determine usage. This is one of the lessons of the ‘compresence 
of opposites’. A Form need not provide us with the kind of definition that establishes 
decisively whether or not an item falls under a predicate. It follows that this might not be the 
type of commonality that Wittgenstein was concerned to deny. 
 On the other hand, neither can it be ruled out that Wittgenstein would have 
countenanced extending his rejection of a commonality even to the kind that I have associated 
with the Forms. This, though, would lead to two problems, the second of which is specially 
pertinent to a discussion of Plato.  
 The first problem is that it makes the status of Wittgenstein’s positive account as to 
why certain groupings occur, as marked by general terms, very unclear. Appeal to criss-
crossing resemblances and relations seems to leave us with no interesting or plausible 
constraints on what may count as a member of a particular group (Richman 1962; Griffin 
1974). We would expect amorphous groupings of disparate items, with new members arising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Thanks to a referee for raising this concern. 
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simply on the basis of some unspecified resemblance to some one or other previous member 
of the group. This is not a promising picture.22 
 The second problem relates to intelligibility. If there was no commonality, nothing 
corresponding to our grasp of a word besides the practice of using the word for such-and-such 
items, there would be no place in our explanation for something that provides, for the 
understanding, the knowledge of ‘what it is’ (as discussed in section 2). Arguably, this 
concern is expressed by Plato’s Parmenides.  If a person gives up on the existence of Forms,  
 
he won’t have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn’t allow that for each thing 
there is a character that is always the same. In this way he will destroy the power of 
dialectic entirely (Parmenides 135b–c). 
 
Commentators note that ‘dialectic’ here could have a general everyday sense of ‘dialogue, 
conversation’. If this non-technical reading is correct, this passage would show a link between 
the Forms and the very possibility of linguistic communication (and see Theaetus 147b, noted 
in section 2; Bostock 1994). A link is compelling: knowledge of an alignment between a word 
and an extension does not constitute any grasp of a ‘what it is’, and yet it is just such a grasp 
that appears to characterize our everyday understanding of the words we use.  
 The reference in the passage to something that is ‘always the same’ corresponds to 
the changeless nature of the Forms. A significant, though often overlooked, linguistic parallel 
clearly presents itself: while our understanding of the things and situations that words are 
used to speak about is forever changing, there is much less motivation to suggest that there is 
any corresponding growth or change in our understanding of the words themselves. For 
example, my understanding of engines is always open to change, while my understanding of 
the word ‘engine’ appears to be a fixed point—possibly largely fixed since I first 
comprehended the word. Of course, there are some caveats here. Some types of polysemy are 
learnt over time, and we can have mistaken understandings. But there remains a secure 
intuition that we have a fixed, and completely adequate, understanding of most of the words 
we use.  
 While theorists may mention that we need accounts of language change, we also need 
an account of how words display constancy of meaning over centuries. Examples listed in the 
Oxford English Dictionary indicate that we can trace back a contemporary sense of 
‘emergency’ 300 years, ‘engine’ 400 years, ‘large’ 500 years, ‘obstacle’ 600 years, ‘open’ 
700 years. What is constant enables us to understand discourse from centuries ago, though we 
may be confused about the kind of engines (for example) that were being spoken about. To 
put this another way, there is nothing about our understanding of most words that needs to 
change, even if there is considerable change in the items those words are used to speak about. 





Plato’s account of the Forms provides an explanation for why a predicate may apply to items 
that display ‘many manifestations [phantazomena polla]’ (Republic V 476a), that vary in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Gert 1995 argues that Wittgenstein did not suppose that ‘resemblances’ form the basis of a grouping, 
and I agree that this need not be the way we construe Wittgenstein’s introduction of the ‘family 
resemblance’ point—but neither is it clear that this would be an incorrect construal. 
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‘every sort of way [pantoiōs]’ (ibid. VI 484b), and can be ‘in some way even quite unlike 
each other’, even ‘contrary’ [enantias] to each other (Philebus 12c, 13a). It offers us an 
approach to word meaning that is consistent with a lack of determinacy in use, and yet which 
does not take the Wittgenstein inspired route of abjuring a fixed, changeless point in our 
account of what it is to understand a word. Rather, we retain a place for a constant element in 
our thought that both corresponds to a grasp of ‘what it is’ and, arguably, plays the central 





Adomello, F. 2013. Plato’s conception of the forms: some remarks. In R. Chiaradonna and G. 
Galluzzo (eds), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, pp. 41–86 (Edizioni della Normale, Pisa). 
Bostock, D. 1986. Plato’s Phaedo (Oxford: Clarendon Press).  
Bostock, D. 1994.  Plato on understanding language. In S. Everson (ed.) Companions to 
Ancient Thought 3: Language, pp. 10–27 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Blutner, R. 1998. Lexical pragmatics. Journal of Semantics 15:2, pp. 115–162. 
Carston, R. 2002.  Thoughts and Utterances (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Chomsky, N. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Fine, G. 1995. On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Forster, M. 2010. Wittgenstein on family resemblance concepts. In A. Ahmed (ed.) 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide, pp. 66–87 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Frede, D. 1999.  Plato on what the body’s eye tells the mind’s eye.  Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 99, pp. 91–209. 
Gert, H. 1995. Family resemblances and criteria. Synthese 105:2, pp. 177–190. 
Griffin, N. 1974. Wittgenstein, universals and family resemblances. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 3:4, pp. 635–651. 
Harte, V. 2002. Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Harte, V. 2011. Plato’s metaphysics. In G. Fine (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Plato, pp. 
191–216 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Hoyningen-Huene, P. 2015.  A note on the concept of game (or rather Spiel). In G. Betz, D. 
Koppelberg, D. Löwenstein, A. Wehofsits (eds) Weiter denken – über Philosophie, 
Wissenschaft und Religion, pp. 205–210 (Berlin: de Gruyter). 
Ide, H. 2002. Complex property structure in Plato’s Philebus. Ancient Philosophy 22:2, pp. 
263–276. 
Irwin, T. 1995. Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
McCabe, M. M. 1994. Plato’s Individuals (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press). 
Millikan, R. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas (Cambride: Cambridge University Press). 
Moravcsik, J. 1990. Thought and Language (London: Routledge). 
Nehamas, A. 1975. Plato on the imperfection of the sensible world. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 12:2, pp. 105–117. 
	   18	  
Nehamas, A. 1979. Self-predication and Plato’s theory of forms. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16:2, pp. 93–103. 
Pietroski, P. 2005. Meaning before truth. In G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds) Contextualism in 
Philosophy, pp. 255–302 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Politis, V. 2010. Explanation and essence in Plato’s Phaedo. In D. Charles (ed.) Definitions in 
Greek Philosophy, pp. 62–114 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Prior, W. 1983.  The concept of paradeigma in Plato’s theory of Forms.  Apeiron 17(1), pp. 
33–42. 
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Recanati, F. 2010. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Richman, R.  1962. “Something Common”.  The Journal of Philosophy 59:26, pp. 821–830. 
Rowe, C. 1993. Plato: Phaedo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Sedley, D. 1998. Platonic causes. Phronesis 43:2, pp. 114–132. 
Sedley, D. 2007. Equal sticks and stones. In D. Scott (ed.) Maieusis: Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, pp. 68–86 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Silverman, A. 2002.  The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
Thomas, C. 2014.  Plato on metaphysical explanation: does ‘participating’ mean nothing?  
Studia Philosophica Estonica 7(2), pp. 168–194. 
Vlastos, G. 1969. Reasons and causes in the Phaedo. The Philosophical Review 78:3, pp. 
291–325. 
White, N. 1992.  Plato’s metaphysical epistemology.  In R. Kraut (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Plato, pp. 277–310 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell).  
Wittgenstein, L. (1972). The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell).  
Wolfsdorf, D. (2003). Understanding the ‘What is F?’ question. Apeiron 36, pp. 175–188.  
